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Foreword 
 
This Working Paper is an early output of a research project exploring the potential of Payment for 
Environmental Services (PES) schemes in coastal and watershed contexts in Indonesia. It is intended 
to provide a literature-based review of Indonesian PES schemes in watershed contexts, in 
preparation for a more detailed analysis to be conducted through field visits to selected PES 
schemes.  The research is being conducted under the auspices of the joint German-Indonesian 
research program Science for the Protection of Indonesian Coastal Marine Ecosystems (SPICE) III,  
Topic 4:  Terrestrial Influences on Mangrove Ecology and Sustainability of their resources (TIMES), 
Subproject 8: Upstream-downstream linkages and new instruments in coastal and watershed 
governance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the mid-1990s, the concept of Payment for Environmental Services (PES) has become 
increasingly prominent in the environmental policy arena, where it is framed as an innovative way 
of addressing environmental governance issues (Andersson et al., 2011; Börner et al., 2010; Jack et 
al., 2008; Laurans et al., 2012; Staton et al., 2010). At their simplest, PES schemes1 are conceived as 
ways of incentivizing land and resource use practices which are thought to have positive effects on 
the environment or, in the current idiom, to provide positive externalities in the form of ecosystem 
services. Over the past decade, the implementation and analysis of these schemes has increased 
markedly, especially related to programs in tropical developing countries2
 
 (Staton et al., 2010, p. 
614). 
The size of PES schemes in these regions ranges from national level initiatives (for example, in Costa 
Rica and Mexico) to small pilot projects of less than one hundred hectares. They cover a range of 
ecosystems and environmental services and they also vary in terms of the involvement of 
governments in their implementation, the mix of users/ buyers funding the initiatives, and the 
involvement of intermediary organizations, among others (Wunder et al., 2008). Unsurprisingly, as 
the number of schemes has increased, heterogeneity in terms of geographical distribution, spatial 
scale, design elements and types of stakeholders involved has also risen. Given these conditions, it 
seems fair to characterize PES as a rather diverse and dynamic collection of interventions.  
 
Different drivers have led to the development of PES mechanisms, which is evident from the simple 
fact that such schemes cover a variety of ecosystems and environmental services – to date primarily 
water quality and quantity, biodiversity and its benefits, carbon sequestration and storage, and 
landscape values (Landell-Mills & Porras, 2002; Wunder, 2005). Some schemes are driven by site-
specific concerns (for example, improved watershed management), while others are clearly driven 
by global priorities (for example, biodiversity protection and climate change mitigation). As can be 
expected, the background for the development of PES schemes covering such a wide range of 
situations has not been linear or coherent.   
 
PES in Indonesia has been rather slow to develop when compared to, for example, countries in Latin 
America. Most existing schemes in Indonesia focus on watershed or carbon services and are of a 
relatively small scale, with uncertain long-term prospects. Existing schemes have primarily been 
initiated with external support from research organizations, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and different types of donors.  To date a significant portion of academically oriented 
material on PES in Indonesia has been produced by authors associated with the World Agroforestry 
Centre (ICRAF) (see, for example, Ajayi et al., 2012; Leimona et al., 2010; Suyanto et al., 2007; 
Villamor & van Noordwijk, 2011). The International Institute for Environment and Development 
(IIED), working with the Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information 
(LP3ES) has also published material on PES in Indonesia (see, for example, Munawir & Vermeulen, 
2007), and IIED has published several widely cited documents including information and analysis 
                                                             
1 The terms schemes, initiatives, mechanisms and programs are used interchangeable in this document to 
refer to PES interventions. 
2 In this paper the list prepared by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2012) is used to identify “developing” countries. According 
to notes to the list, “[i]n DAC usage, the term “developing country” employed without qualification has 
generally been taken to mean a country eligible for ODA [overseas development assistance].” 
 
2 
 
related to a broad range of PES schemes across countries (see, for example, Bond & Mayers, 2010; 
Landell-Mills & Porras, 2002; Porras et al., 2008).   
 
While authors associated with these organizations are by no means the only ones to have published 
about PES in Indonesia, the dominance of these two organizations is likely because they have each 
had multi-year programs focusing on PES, with components in Indonesia. The ICRAF-led “Rewarding 
Upland Poor for Environmental Services that they provide" (RUPES) program has been in operation 
since 2002. It is a multi-country action research program focused on understanding and developing 
practical environmental service schemes and learning from existing experience 
(rupes.worldagroforestry.org). In 2001 IIED started a project to explore market-based approaches to 
the maintenance of watershed services, while supporting local livelihoods. This work evolved into 
the project, “Developing Markets for Watershed Protection Services and Improved Livelihoods,” 
which also had a multi-country focus.  
 
The first part of this Working Paper (Chapter 2) briefly describes the emergence of PES as a new 
governance mechanism and explores related debates on definitional issues and on the challenges of 
demonstrating environmental impacts. The following main part of the paper (Chapter 3) provides a 
review of experience with PES in watershed settings in Indonesia. The last section (Chapter 4) sums 
up commonalities of the schemes reviewed and identifies open questions that have not yet been 
comprehensively discussed in the PES literature to date or seem particularly relevant for our 
research on PES experiences in Indonesia and their potentials in the context of watershed and 
coastal governance. 
 
The work presented here is mainly based on a desk study which was supplemented by a limited 
number of exploratory interviews with stakeholders at the national level in Indonesia in October 
2012.  
 
2. Emergence, definitions and impacts of PES 
 
While the term Payments for Environmental Services (and related terms like Payments for 
Ecosystem Services or Watershed Services) has only come into wide usage over the past two 
decades, the concept of using market instruments to achieve environmental goals has a longer 
history, with roots going back to the 1970s, at least (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010).  Early examples 
of market instruments used to address environmental problems include agri-environmental 
payments programs in the United Kingdom and Germany, which were started in the mid-1980s to 
maintain and enhance biological diversity in agricultural landscapes (Dobbs & Pretty, 2008; 
Schumacher, 2007) as well as wetland mitigation banking in the United States, which provided a 
means for compensating for damage to wetlands by purchasing mitigation credits from wetland 
areas that were restored or established with the intention of providing such mitigation options 
(Robertson, 2006). 
 
Through the 1990s the concept of ecosystem services was further elaborated (Daily, 1997), with 
economic valuation of these services coming to the forefront in the mid-1990s (Costanza et al., 
1997). Following the publication of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, interest in the concept 
grew significantly, and it gained prominence in policy agendas (Daily et al., 2011). 
 
Within the conservation arena, PES schemes could be viewed as another step in the process of 
protecting natural spaces and ecosystems.  For much of the 20th century the main approach 
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towards conservation was based on exclusion through, for example, the establishment of protected 
areas. Starting in the 1980s, in response to criticisms aimed at such excluding approaches, especially 
in multi-use landscapes in developing countries, the concepts of integrated conservation and 
development projects and, in particular, community-based conservation, started to gain traction 
(Swallow et al., 2009). However, the results of these approaches were not always persuasive in 
conservation terms (Berkes, 2004; Wells & Brandon, 1992). With questioning of these approaches 
and a general market-friendly mood in policy circles across different sectors, PES emerged as a 
potential addition to the portfolio of conservation-related governance mechanisms. PES was put 
forward as a way of generating new funding for conservation (Ferraro, 2001; Ferraro & Kiss, 2002) 
and improving efficiency in the use of such funds (Engel et al., 2008; Van Hecken & Bastiaensen, 
2010). With the inclusion of conservation as an element of REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation, including the roles of conservation, sustainable management 
of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks) under the global climate change mitigation 
umbrella, the potential funding and coverage of PES schemes in the conservation portfolio appears 
set to multiply, especially in relation to carbon storage and sequestration. 
 
2.1 Definitions 
 
This section explores some of the debates that continue to surround the definition of PES.  It does 
so without going into the controversial discussions between proponents and implementers of PES 
on the one hand and critical scholars rejecting PES schemes and their underlying philosophy on the 
other. The latter base their critique on the problematic implications the commodification of nature 
may have for both nature and society, and on concerns that PES may deepen or at least distract 
from problematic power relations and patterns of resource access and control, while diminishing 
chances for bottom-up natural resource management (see, for example, Kosoy & Corbera, 2010; 
McAfee, 2012; Milne & Adams, 2012; Norgaard, 2010).  While sharing some of these concerns, we 
discuss different approaches to defining PES in the following from a pragmatic perspective, simply 
as a starting point of our open-ended empirical research on PES experiences in Indonesia. Since such 
programs are currently being implemented in many regions and are in fact being widely promoted 
by different actors, we think that critical engagement with such processes may deliver useful results 
of academic and practical relevance.  
 
Within the academic literature, different views have been put forward about how to define PES, and 
what that means for the efficiency and equity implications of such initiatives.  Several authors have 
noted that a basic divergence appears between definitions that view PES through an environmental 
economics lens and those that use the perspective of ecological economics (Farley & Costanza, 
2010; Fletcher & Breitling, 2012; Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010; Tacconi, 2012). Fletcher and 
Breitling (2012, p. 2060) summarize these differences with a favourable view on the latter approach 
as follows: 
“The environmental economics approach […] prioritizes economic efﬁciency, and tries to force 
ecosystem services into the market model. The ecological economics approach […] focuses on 
the multiple goals of ecological sustainability, just distribution and economic efﬁciency and 
favors a variety of payment mechanisms to achieve these goals, both market and non-market. 
Appropriate institutions and mechanisms are determined by and adapted to the relevant 
characteristics of the ecosystems and services in question.” 
 
The environmental economics approach to PES is captured by the widely used definition put 
forward by Wunder (2005, p. 3), which describes PES as: 
“1.  a voluntary transaction where 
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  2.  a well-defined environmental service (or a land use likely to secure that service) 
  3.  is being “bought” by a (minimum one) environmental service buyer 
  4.  from a (minimum one) environmental service provider 
  5.  if and only if the environmental service provider secures environmental service provision 
(conditionality).” 
 
It should be noted here that users of this definition readily admit that it does not fully capture the 
diversity of PES schemes (Wunder et al., 2008, p. 839). As Vatn (2010, p. 1247) explained, Wunder’s 
definition,   
“is more like a theoretical reference point. It does not emphasize the specific problems 
involved when creating a market for environmental services, specifically how transaction costs 
influence the format of payments. This does not imply that Wunder is unaware of these issues 
— he uses much space on discussing them in various papers. They are just not well captured in 
his definition. Hence it is more about what PES should be according to a certain perspective 
than what it really is or can be.” 
 
In contrast to the definition of PES grounded in the environmental economics perspective, 
Muradian et al. (2010, p. 1202) aim to develop a “conceptual framework [which] is more sensitive to 
different sources of complexity embedded in PES”. They note that the fact that the widely used 
prescriptive definition does not capture the characteristics of the majority of existing PES schemes 
speaks to the limited utility of the approach. Building on a discussion of the complexities and 
uncertainties related to elements such as markets, ecological systems, distributional implications, 
social embeddedness, perceptions and power, Muradian et al. (2010, p. 1205) thus propose, “to 
define PES as a transfer of resources between social actors, which aims to create incentives to align 
individual and/or collective land use decisions with the social interest in the management of natural 
resources”. 
 
This definition put forward by Muradian et al. (2010) is not rooted in normative notions of what PES 
or their outcome should be, but is rather neutral and much more encompassing. It also embraces a 
broader range of PES initiatives, which the authors suggest can be clustered according to three 
criteria: i) the importance of the economic incentive, ii) the directness of the transfer, and iii) the 
degree of commodification of environmental services (Muradian et al., 2010, p. 1205). With this 
definition and criteria the authors hope that it will be possible to “develop local and regional 
institutional frameworks that can cope with complexity and diversity, and that can integrate PES 
within existing regimes of rural development and other policy instruments for environmental 
protection” (Muradian et al., 2010, p. 1207). 
 
In a continuation of the definitional debate, Tacconi (2012) compared the two approaches above, 
and put forward an alternate definition. According to this definition, a PES scheme should be viewed 
as “a transparent system for the additional provision of environmental services through conditional 
payments to voluntary providers” (Tacconi, 2012, p. 35). This definition expresses clearly the 
requirement of conditionality which is agreed by other authors as a core criterion of PES (Kroeger, 
2012), distinguishing it from various other environmental governance instruments. By characterizing 
PES as “transparent” systems, involving “voluntary” providers, however, the author brings in new 
normative notions that seem less helpful for a sober look at PES experiences. 
 
For the purposes of our work, we have therefore chosen to stick with the simple and neutral 
definition proposed by Muradian et al. (2010), keeping the criterion of conditionality in mind. Over 
the course of our research, we may come to a more nuanced definition based on our findings 
regarding the conceptualization, implementation and impacts of PES in Indonesian watersheds.  
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2.2 Showing environmental impacts 
 
Despite the increasing interest in PES schemes over the past decade, the body of evidence 
answering the question, “Do PES schemes result in environmental impacts beyond those that would 
have happened without the schemes?” is drawn from a rather thin representation of relevant 
studies (Pattanayak et al., 2010). While this is by no means the only important question with respect 
to PES schemes, it is a critical one. Without assurances that the proposed interventions will result in 
the desired environmental services, the very premise of the mechanism is undermined, and there is 
a risk that buyers may be reluctant to engage in such schemes, or, as Kroeger (2012, p. 8) pointed 
out, “[t]he widespread lack of appropriate service definitions and the resulting inability to 
demonstrate the absolute and comparative performance of PES programs in both biophysical and 
monetary terms represents the perhaps most serious challenge to the future of the PES approach.” 
 
In addition to the conceptual-theoretical literature (for examples, see Section 2.1), our 
understanding of the functioning of PES schemes and of their impacts in terms of environmental 
service delivery tends to come from qualitative case studies, quantitative, often econometric, 
studies, and meta analyses.   
 
Qualitative case studies often combine document reviews with field work and spatial analysis, in a 
mixed-method approach. These case studies mainly describe the establishment of PES mechanisms, 
their modes of operation and the actors involved, sometimes coupled with land use change 
analyses. See for example, the 14 cases discussed in Wunder (2008), context-rich cases describing 
the development of Mexico’s national PES program (McAfee & Shapiro, 2010) or small-scale PES 
schemes in Cambodia (Milne & Adams, 2012), and the work of Scullion et al. (2011, pp. 427-428), 
combining “a time-series analysis of remotely-sensed forest cover change with surveys and field 
interviews of PES programme participants and informed community members”. 
 
Quantitative, often econometric, studies typically attempt to attribute causality to environmental 
outcomes. Such studies have been conducted at both sub-national and national scales. Much of this 
literature is related to the PES programs in Costa Rica and Mexico, which is not surprising given the 
size and duration of these programs. See for example the work of Daniels et al. (2010) (Costa Rica) 
and Alix-Garcia et al. (2012) (Mexico). The findings of these authors highlight the difficulties in 
attributing causality with respect to environmental outcomes. In the Costa Rican case, which 
compared two studies at the national and two at the sub-national level using forest cover as a proxy 
for forest-based ecosystem services, the findings between the two spatial scales differed. The 
authors attribute these differences to the framing of the analyses, with the sub-national studies 
taking into account more details of the PES implementation process and context within which the 
schemes were established and implemented. In the Mexican case, since forest conservation is a 
proxy for environmental service delivery, there was no attempt to directly account for impacts on 
water quality and quantity. The findings showed that while the program had “small to moderate 
impacts on deforestation between 2003 and 2006” (Alix-Garcia et al., 2012, p. 614), since overall 
clearing rates were low in any case, the overall impacts of the program were modest. 
 
Meta analyses use statistical techniques to combine findings across multiple studies or cases.  For 
example, Brouwer et al. (2011) conducted a meta-analysis of 47 Payment for Watershed Services 
(PWS) schemes. Their analysis was designed to identify the institutional-economic factors 
contributing to the environmental performance of these schemes. The authors noted that empirical 
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quantitative information on the environmental performance of the schemes was often lacking, and 
highlighted that this, 
“confirm[ed] the need for establishing quantifiable environmental watershed objectives and 
monitoring progress towards reaching these objectives. Less than half of the schemes used 
quantifiable indicators and monitoring the impact of the schemes on environmental 
performance. In a majority of these cases, the indicators furthermore referred to the efforts 
put into scheme implementation (such as area with forest cover) instead of the actual impacts 
and outcomes of the scheme.” (Brouwer et al., 2011, pp. 389-390) 
 
In summary, it appears that the different analyses that have been conducted to date show rather 
modest results with respect to the attributable impacts question posed at the beginning of this 
section (Pattanayak et al., 2010). In each case there are explanations for uncertain or weak results. 
They include, among others, i) a paucity of usable data, ii) the early stage of the programs at the 
time studies were undertaken and the fact that the schemes were still being refined (e.g. Mexico 
and Costa Rica), and iii) difficulties in separating the influence of the PES schemes from the impacts 
of pre-existing policies (e.g. Costa Rica). Additionally, according to Pattanayak et al. (2010), the 
problem of data availability is exacerbated by the fact that programs, including those set up 
recently, are not designed with evaluation in mind, and practitioners tend to monitor for 
compliance with program requirements (e.g. number of hectares protected) rather than evaluate 
actual environmental impacts.  
 
In highlighting the weak state of empirical studies, Pattanayak et al. (2010) note that while it is 
understandable for empirical work to lag behind theory, in the case of PES the situation is worrying, 
especially as it seems there is little improvement in sight. Ferraro (2011, p. 1134) goes further, 
stating that, “greater use of PES is unwarranted unless new or expanded systems are designed 
explicitly to measure PES’s environmental and social effects and to explore competing notions of 
effective contract design”. 
 
On a more positive note, Pattanayak et al. (2010, p. 268) note that this lack of PES evaluation is 
likely to change, at least with respect to carbon-related PES schemes, with the emergence of REDD. 
Their optimism 
“stems from three features of REDD. First, it has the clear goal of additionality. Second, large 
amounts of international resources are being poured into its design and the implementation 
of pilot initiatives. We are confident that some fraction of those resources will be devoted to 
monitoring and evaluation. Third, given the advances in science and remote sensing, carbon 
storage is becoming easier to measure and monitor, especially compared to biodiversity and 
watershed services.” 
 
Notwithstanding the lack of clear evidence about the environmental impacts of PES schemes, it 
seems important to gain a deeper contextual understanding of the processes leading to adoption of 
new governance mechanisms, and the implications that such processes have on access and 
decisions related to natural resources and other livelihood considerations. With Kosoy et al. (2007, 
p. 454) we believe that “[t]he social embeddedness of markets for environmental services and the 
social transformation they trigger are very relevant topics for further research”. 
 
3. Watershed PES Experience in Indonesia 
  
The policy environment in Indonesia presents no explicit barriers (i.e. prohibition) to the 
implementation of PES schemes. In fact, there is an emerging policy frameworks supporting PES, 
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which can be viewed as two processes unfolding in parallel: a more rapidly developing framework 
supporting payments for carbon services under the auspices of REDD, and a more slowly developing 
framework flowing from the Environmental Protection and Management Law of 2009 (Republic of 
Indonesia, 2009), which covers a broader range of environmental services.  Since this paper focusses 
mainly on watershed services, and much has already been written about the REDD+ policy 
framework in Indonesia (see, for example, Angelsen et al., 2009; Angelsen et al., 2012) we will 
briefly touch on the less prominent developments under the Environmental Protection and 
Management Law in the following. 
 
Indonesian Law No. 32/2009 on Environmental Protection and Management makes specific mention 
of the development of PES mechanisms under Paragraph 8 on environmental economic 
instruments. The law makes reference to mechanisms of environmental compensation/ exchange 
between regions, and notes that such mechanisms can be, “adopted by regional people, 
communities and/ or governments as users of environmental services for providers of 
environmental services” (Article 43, Paragraph 1c). Its implementation should be supported by 
issuance of a government regulation on economic instruments (Article 43, Paragraph 4), which 
would also cover PES. According to interviews conducted in October 2012, the PES component of 
this regulation would in turn be supported by ministerial guidance in the form of a protocol on PES.  
It is currently unclear when the regulation on economic instruments will be issued, but it appears 
that the PES protocol has almost been completed, with dissemination to stakeholders expected to 
take place before the end of 2012 (interview, October 2012). The protocol shall provide guidance on 
how to develop PES schemes for the following services: watershed, carbon, biodiversity, scenic 
beauty.  
 
Whereas the policy framework seems to be rather supportive of PES, or moving in that direction, 
other institutional factors, and in particular land tenure, could act as serious limiting factors to 
implementation of such schemes in Indonesia. The vast majority of official forest land (areas which 
are designated as forest, but may not necessarily be forested) is part of the statutory tenure system, 
although it may be de facto used collectively or by individuals (Angelsen et al., 2012; FAO, 2011). In 
addition, there are layers of customary rights that are not officially or not fully recognized by the 
state, and cases of those rights overlapping between groups (for an example from West Kalimantan, 
see Putra et al., 2008). Even within state forest land there are sometimes overlapping claims to land, 
with cases of conflicting licenses for areas of land being issued by different parts of government 
(Mangkusubroto, 2012). While private property is not a necessary prerequisite for a PES scheme, as 
shown for example by the issuance of contracts to communal land owners in Mexico (Alix-Garcia et 
al., 2012), lack of control over the asset producing the ecosystem service, typically land and land 
cover, is a barrier to participation (Wunder & Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2009, p. 578).  For example, land 
users are less likely to invest in an area of land if their tenure is not secure, and lack of clear tenure 
can make negotiating contracts difficult (Leimona et al., 2009).  In Indonesia, cases of insecure land 
tenure are abundant, and as such, addressing tenure concerns is likely to remain a top priority if PES 
schemes are to continue to develop in the country. 
 
Over the last decade a number of academic articles and grey literature sources have examined 
existing or developing PWS schemes in Indonesia. A scan of the literature in June and August 2012 
using different academic and popular, non-academic search engines and including English and 
Indonesian key words revealed the following schemes in Indonesia that seem to be either in 
operation, proposed, or have been operational: i. Greater Aceh district and Peusangan watershed, 
Aceh; ii. Lake Toba, North Sumatra; iii. Sumberjaya, Lampung;  iv. Singkarak, West Sumatra; v. 
Bungo, Jambi; vi. Cidanau, Bantam; vii. Citarum, West Java; viii. Kuningan, West Java; ix. Brantas, 
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East Java; x. Kapuas Hulu, West Kalimantan; xi. Wain River, East Kalimantan; xii. Malinau and Paser, 
East Kalimantan; xiii. West Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara. This list is likely not complete; it has 
simply been used as a starting point for identification of PWS schemes relevant to our research.  
 
Not all of the schemes listed above will be explored in this paper. The schemes described below are 
those for which there is enough information available from online sources to obtain at least a 
summary picture of the context, establishment process and implementation mechanism of the 
scheme. Some schemes are mentioned in documents, but very little additional information is 
provided. This is in line with the findings of Porras et al. (2008) who found that 37 of the 95 PWS 
schemes in developing countries that they reviewed could be categorized as preliminary proposals, 
which had been announced, but for which there was little information. They also noted that of the 
41 PWS schemes identified as proposed or ongoing by Landell-Mills and Porras (2002), relatively few 
were still in progress by the time the 2008 review took place. All this to say that the situation is 
changing rapidly and information is often limited. 
 
The information presented below is almost exclusively based upon literature sources, with the 
exception of Kapuas Hulu and some of the background information for the Lombok scheme, which 
draw on interviews conducted in October 2012. As a result, information is incomplete and some of 
it may be outdated. In 2013 field visits will be made to update information on a selected number of 
schemes. 
 
3.1 Lake Toba 
 
According to the literature reviewed to date, the oldest scheme labeled “PES” in Indonesia is in the 
Lake Toba catchment in Northern Sumatra. It is unclear from available information whether the 
scheme, which is reported as having started in 1985 (Chandler & Suyanto, 2004), is on-going (IIED 
watershedmarkets.org, accessed 20 August, 2012). Overall information about the scheme is rather 
sparse, and most references appear to draw on the same source material. The scheme is an 
arrangement whereby PT Indonesia Asahan Aluminium makes a contribution to a Nature 
Conservation Fund for Lake Toba, to be used for the rehabilitation of critical lands in five districts in 
the Lake Toba catchment (Chandler & Suyanto, 2004). The company generates electricity from the 
Asahan River to operate its aluminum smelting operations and is therefore interested in sediment 
reduction. It is not clear how the Nature Conservation Fund distributes the funds, what land use 
activities are supported, or what the arrangements are with landholders (IIED 
watershedmarkets.org, accessed 20 August, 2012).  
 
3.2 Sumberjaya – conditional land tenure 
 
In the Sumberjaya sub-district in West Lampung, RUPES and other stakeholders have been involved 
in at least two innovative environmental services initiatives – one using conditional tenure as an 
incentive for land use change, and one using payments conditional upon reaching certain levels of 
sedimentation reduction.  RUPES uses the term “rewards” rather than “payments,” to indicate that 
systems to address environmental externalities can be based on a range of incentives, not just 
financial payments. This “rewards” approach is at the core of the first of the two schemes. 
 
The 55,000 ha Sumberjaya sub-district, whose boundaries are close to those of the Way Besay 
watershed, is a mountainous area in West Lampung district (Suyanto, 2007). The watershed 
experienced a steady decrease in forest area from 1970, when forest cover was 60%, to 2000, when 
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forest cover was only 12%. Over the same period, the area of coffee increased from 7% of the total 
land area to 70% (Verbist et al., 2005). Initially the coffee was planted without shade trees, but in 
the 1980s this started to change and more shade trees were planted, resulting in a certain level of 
“re-greening.” There were multiple drivers of land use change between 1970 and 2000, including 
increases in global coffee prices in the 1970s and 1980s, in-migration and reductions in 
transportation costs due to infrastructure improvements (Verbist et al., 2005).  
 
Land tenure in Sumberjaya has been marked by a high level of uncertainty. In 1990 a decade long 
land classification process was completed for the Sumberjaya watershed (Verbist et al., 2005), 
which resulted in about 40% of the land being classified as Protection Forest, a category intended to 
protect watershed functions, 10% as a National Park and the remainder as private land (Pender et 
al., 2008, p. 75). At around the same time the decision was made to establish a run-of-the-river 
hydropower plant on the Way Besai River. This led to increasing concerns about the impacts of soil 
erosion and sedimentation from coffee farms on the operations of the plant. In response to these 
concerns, in the 1990s there were large evictions from Protection Forest areas, often accompanied 
by violent confrontations between residents and government officials (Verbist et al., 2005).  Tension 
in the area diffused at the end of the 1990s with the opening of space for dialogue that marked the 
start of the reform (reformasi) period, and moves towards decentralization and changes in 
approaches to addressing issues of communities reliant on state forest land (Arifin et al., 2009; 
Verbist et al., 2005). 
 
In 2001 the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry issued a decree on community forestry (Hutanan 
Kemasyarakatan – HKm), which provided the opportunity for farmers’ groups to obtain conditional 
tenure for state protected forest land for an initial period of five years, with a potential extension to 
25 years if terms and conditions of the agreements are met. In order to obtain the permits,  
“a group must establish internal regulations to ensure management of the forest area 
according to prevailing laws; use participatory procedures for decision making, conflict 
resolution, and organizational management; be recognized by the community through the 
village administrative head; and prepare a location plan indicating the area to be managed, 
protection and cultivation blocks, and the period and plan for managing the area.” (Pender et 
al., 2008, p. 2) 
 
According to Arifin (2005), these requirements are quite challenging for groups to fulfill.  
 
Once the permits have been granted, contracts require farmers to grow at least 400 trees per 
hectare, with at least 30% of the trees being timber species. Farmers do not have the rights to cut 
and sell the timber trees (Arifin et al., 2009).  Conditionality is based on a number of criteria and 
determines for how long the tenure is extended beyond its initial stage (Suyanto, 2007, p. 33). 
 
In 2004 RUPES became actively involved as an intermediary working to facilitate a scaling up of 
farmers obtaining HKm permits (Pasha & Leimona, 2011).  According to Arifin et al. (2009, p. 2042), 
“[a]s of 2005, 28% of the protected forest area was managed through HKm contracts, 56% of the 
area was in process of negotiation for HKm contracts, while the remaining 16% had no community 
forestry status.” In 2006 permits were granted to all outstanding applicants, increasing the area 
covered to 11,633ha (Kerr et al., 2008). Initially permits were for five years. Pender et al. (2008) 
reported that subsequently some groups had been granted 25 year permits, but up-to-date 
information is lacking, as is information about any subsequent permits granted after 2006. 
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3.3 Sumberjaya – Results-based sedimentation reduction (RiverCare) 
 
From the literature reviewed to date it appears that the results-based sedimentation reduction 
work of RUPES was conducted in two phases. Information presented here covers the period up to 
the beginning of 2009. Additional sources of information need to be sought for post-2008 activities 
and impacts. Despite the pilot nature and small scale of the work, it is interesting to note that it has 
a special place in the literature on PES as one of the few non-carbon PES schemes which includes 
results-based conditionality. As noted by Porras et al. (2008, p. 2) in their review of multiple PWS 
schemes, 
“[b]ecause of the challenges in measuring and attributing changes in the provision of 
watershed services, all of the ongoing PWS schemes identified follow a land-based approach. 
Providers of watershed services are paid for changes to their land-management practices that 
are believed to have a high probability of resulting in the desired impact on watershed 
services. One exception is the […]  [RUPES]-promoted RiverCare scheme in Sumberjaya, 
Indonesia, which is experimenting with payment according to extent of sediment reduction 
achieved.” 
 
The first phase, conducted in one community in one sub-catchment, was a learning period for both 
farmers and RUPES (intermediary), and was intended to show the State Electricity Company (PLN), 
which operates a hydropower plant on the Wey Besey River, that it would be possible to directly 
contract farmers to reduce sedimentation. Sedimentation reduction activities included construction 
and maintenance of check dams, terraces and drainage along pathways (Suyanto, 2007, p. 33). In 
this phase, a “RiverCare” community group was formed to lead in the activities. RUPES acted as a 
stand in buyer, as well as providing support for strengthening capacity and financing for start-up 
activities. RiverCare as the seller and RUPES as the buyer, signed a contract which included specific 
payments for achieved levels of sediment reduction: Reduction of 30% or more - USD1,000; 
reduction of 20-30% - USD700; reduction of 10-20% - USD500; reduction of less than 10% - USD250 
(Suyanto, 2007). 
 
By the completion of the contract at the end of 2007, the level of sedimentation reduction was 
under 10% due to a landslide in the catchment, something which was out of the hands of the 
RiverCare group. Based on this level of sedimentation reduction, as per the contract, a payment of 
USD250 was made (Huang et al., 2009). Based on this experience, PLN was interested enough in the 
concept to agree to invest in a one year scheme for sedimentation reduction. 
 
Unless otherwise noted, the summary here of the second phase of activities is drawn from the 
ICRAF working paper by Pasha et al. (2010), which provide details about how the scheme was 
established and implemented and reflections on the conceptual implications of the experiences. The 
program was implemented in the sub-village (dusun) of Buluh Kapur, which is under the village 
(desa) of Gunung Terang in the sub-catchment of Air Ringkih. This sub catchment has an area of 522 
hectares. The program ran from February 2008 until February 2009.  Farmers in the village, joined 
together in a RiverCare goup, were the sellers of the service; the hydropower company under PLN 
was the buyer; and RUPES acted as intermediary, negotiating with PLN, and helping RiverCare to set 
up the necessary systems. Negotiations with the company resulted in an agreement the full amount 
would be paid if the sediment amount was reduced by 30%. The company agreed to provide a lump 
sum amount to the RiverCare group of Buluh Kapur as operational funding for undertaking the 
conservation activities to reduce sedimentation. Fifty percent of the funds were provided upon 
signature of the contract, and 50% after the activity had been running for three months. Conditional 
payments to the RiverCare group at the end of the project were agreed as follows for different 
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levels of sedimentation reduction: Reduction of 30% or greater – micro-power unit with a value of 
Rp20,000,000; reductions between 21% and 29% - Rp7,500,000; reductions between 11% and 20% - 
Rp5,000,000; reductions between 1% and 10% - Rp2,500,000. The program of the RiverCare group 
included conservation activities (vegetation, river bank, soil), water monitoring, management of 
local farmers’ groups, and maintenance of interventions undertaken as part of the program. In 
addition to monitoring sediment reduction levels after rainfall events, the program also monitored 
the performance of the various activities. Based on an analysis of the water samples, at the end of 
the program it was determined that the reduction in sedimentation was 20%, meaning that the 
payment to the RiverCare group would be Rp5,000,000. However, after reviewing the monitoring 
reports of program implementation, which were positive and reflected a high level of engagement 
by RiverCare members, the company decided to in any case provide the “top” reward of a micro-
power unit. 
 
RUPES also conducted a third related activity in the watershed. The aim of the field experiment 
“was to assess the feasibility of using auctions in a developing country context and to obtain an 
understanding of the drivers of farmers’ willingness to accept […] compensation for a conservation 
contract” (Leimona & Jack, 2010, p. 162). The activities were carried out between 2006 and 2008. 
The auction resulted in 34 participants receiving one-year contracts covering 25 hectares. The soil 
conservation techniques specified in the contracts comprised soil infiltration pits, vegetation strips 
and ridging between coffee trees. Two qualitative and two quantitative monitoring activities were 
carried out over the year.  Payments were staged and based on achievement of land-use related 
activities, with farmers receiving full payment if they achieved 80% of the contracted activities by 
the end of the contract. At the end of the year, the weakest activity was planting of grass strips; in 
contrast, some farmers exceeded contractual requirements with respect to sediment pits and 
ridging (Leimona & Jack, 2010). 
 
3.4 Cidanau 
 
The Cidanau watershed covers 22,620 hectares and spreads across two districts in Banten province 
on Java. The Cidanau River is the main supplier of water for industrial and domestic use for the city 
of Cilegon. The watershed has experienced significant degradation over the past two decades, and 
various efforts to address the situation have brought little relief.  Approximately 20% of the 
catchment, or an area of 4,300 hectares, is categorized as critical land for surface erosion based on 
national criteria (Munawir & Vermeulen, 2007, p. 24).  
 
In 1998 a group of concerned individuals established the Forum Komunikasi DAS Cidanau (FKDC, 
Cidanau Watershed Communication Forum), which was legally recognized in 2002 through a 
Governor’s decree. The FKDC is a multi-stakeholder entity, including members from upstream and 
downstream stakeholders representing public, private and civil society interests (IIED, 2005; 
Leimona et al., 2010; Munawir & Vermeulen, 2007). In 2002 the concept of PES was introduced to 
the FKDC by several international organizations, following which a representative of a local NGO, 
Rekonvasi Bhumi, went to Costa Rica to visit a PES project being supported by GTZ (now GIZ). This 
led to interest in piloting the approach in the Cidanau Watershed (Leimona et al., 2010).  The main 
problems that the scheme aimed at addressing were perceived decreases in total annual debit and 
dry season flows, sedimentation and eutrophication (Munawir & Vermeulen, 2007, p. 24).  PT 
Krakatau Tirta Industry (KTI) is the primary licensee, extracting water from the watershed for 
supplying domestic and industrial customers, including a hydropower station and has led, “  
conservation, weed clearance, dredging and hydrological research programmes over the past 30 
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years, in partnership with a range of government departments” (Munawir & Vermeulen, 2007, p. 
26). The company is also a member of the FKDC.  
 
In 2004 the PES scheme in the Cidanau watershed commenced. The scheme links PT KTI as a buyer 
to small scale farmers in the upper areas of the watershed as suppliers, through the FKDC. The FKDC 
acts as an intermediary and has a contractual agreement both with PT KTI on the demand side and 
with small scale farmer groups on the supply side. The FKDC formed an ad hoc group, including 
representatives from government, the buyer and sellers to handle details of implementation, 
including establishment of “an independent, transparent, credible, and accountab[le] 
environmental services organizer institution” (Budhi et al., 2008). 
 
Micro sites for the scheme were selected by Rekonvasi Bhumi and LP3ES. Selection criteria included: 
“1. Categorization of the area as a high contributor of sedimentation from defined critical lands; 
  2.  Residents tend to fell trees at a high rate; and  
  3.  Land at the location belongs to residents and is not far from their housing.” (Munawir & Vermeulen, 
2007, p. 22) 
 
Without going into too many details (for more information see Leimona et al. (2010) and Munawir 
and Vermeulen (2007)), at the beginning the PES scheme involved two villages, with a total target of 
50 hectares of land planted with 500 trees per hectare. In 2007 two more villages joined the 
scheme, adding an additional 50 hectares (25 hectares per village) (Leimona et al., 2010). Staged 
payments were spread out over five years, and payments reduced in cases where farmers did not 
meet the target planting, cut the trees or did not care for them.  Sellers formed two farmers’ groups 
which signed contracts with the FKDC.  The Ad Hoc team is responsible for monitoring activities. 
Information received from an interview with a representative of ICRAF in October 2012 indicated 
that new contracts have been signed in Cidanau, but no details were available. 
 
3.5 Kapuas Hulu 
 
The basic premise of the envisioned PES scheme in Kapuas Hulu, West Kalimantan is that if erosion, 
sedimentation and turbidity in the Kapuas River’s tributaries and their catchments can be reduced, 
water quality will be improved, which is of particular interest to the District Water Company (PDAM) 
based in the city of Putussibau. Plans for the establishment of a PES scheme in Kapuas Hulu have 
been underway since at least 2006, when a joint program, “Equitable Payments for Watershed 
Services” (EPWS) was launched by WWF, CARE and IIED. This multi-country program focused on five 
countries and was initially designed with two phases. The first was an 18 month preparatory phase 
to develop business cases for PWS schemes. The second phase, planned to last three to four years, 
was actual implementation of such schemes in target watersheds (WWF, 2006). Funding support 
was provided by DANIDA and DGIS. In 2008 mention was made of a third phase (Tresiera, 2008). In 
this document, the second phase was described as involving activities aiming at land-use changes in 
selected communities, accompanied by close monitoring of impacts on water quality and 
livelihoods. Implementation of PWS schemes was expected by the end of 2011. The third phase 
would start after this, and, “would tentatively start with buyers and sellers of watershed services 
establishing legally binding contractual agreements.” (Tresiera, 2008). 
 
It is currently unclear what preparations were undertaken in Kapuas Hulu prior to the start of the 
EPWS program.  During the first phase of EPWS, which is reported to have run in Kapuas Hulu until 
2009 (interview, October 2012), a rapid hydrological assessment was conducted of the Kapuas Hulu 
basin. This study, “revealed [that] there are early signs of watershed degradation, such as erosion 
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and sedimentation in the river” (Lusiana et al., 2008, p. 51), and while cautioning that PWS schemes 
would likely not address all the issues leading to this situation, it was noted that such an approach 
could play a role as one among a broader range of interventions. In addition to the hydrological 
assessment, other studies were undertaken looking at community livelihoods, and the policy and 
legal context. An economic analysis focusing on cost and benefit assessment was also conducted 
(Putra et al., 2008). 
 
In the second phase, the program focused on the Mendalam River, a tributary of the Kapuas River. A 
variety of activities are reported to have been implemented, including restoration of approximately 
212 hectares of riparian land in five villages along the river, community capacity development 
activities and monitoring of impacts (WWF, 2012).  Following the restoration of the riparian areas, 
an external evaluation of impacts was conducted by LIPI (the Indonesian Institute of Sciences) and 
ICRAF. The report is expected to be ready towards the end of 2012, and initial findings seem to 
indicate that the activities led to a reduction of riverine sediment transport (interview, October 
2012). 
 
As of this writing it seems that the program in Kapuas Hulu is somewhere near the end of phase two 
as mentioned by Tresiera (2008).  On the basis of the findings of the independent evaluation, the 
plan is to develop a relationship with PDAM in support of PWS. Before this can proceed, however, it 
is first necessary to convince PDAM that it is possible to reduce sedimentation. The agreement with 
PDAM will, among other things, need to take into consideration the willingness of PDAM’s 
customers to pay for these watershed services.  There is also interest in replicating the approach in 
the Sibau sub-watershed.  
 
3.6 Citarum 
 
There is relatively little information available on the pilot PES scheme in a sub-watershed of the 
Citarum watershed in West Java. The scheme was initiated with a grant from the Asian 
Development Bank to LP3ES in 2009, based on an inception report prepared in 2008 (ADB, 2009). 
One of the justifications for having the pilot in the Citarum watershed was the fact that the ADB had 
an on-going program in the watershed. The ADB web site explains that the grant for the pilot and 
demonstration activity is to  
“help develop and demonstrate the use of a compensation mechanism for watershed protection 
services in Citarum. One of its expected outcomes is the formulation of a policy on payment for 
environmental services. Recommendations to emerge from this [pilot and demonstration 
activity] will be considered in the on-going preparation of ADB’s Integrated Citarum Water 
Resources Management Project.” (ADB, 2009)  
 
The Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program – Project 1, is a large 
program in the watershed, comprised of loan, technical assistance and grant funding from a variety 
of sources. It includes a component on “assessment of the potential for development of 
mechanisms for payment for environmental services (PES)” (ADB, 2012).  
 
The pilot project seems to have been implemented over the period of a year between 2009 and 
2010.  Two contracts were signed, one of them between PT Aetra and a farmers’ group in the village 
of Sunten Jaya for an area of 22 hectares. PT Aetra provides water for industrial, business and 
residential areas of East Jakarta and some parts of North and Central Jakarta (PT Aetra, 2012).  A 
second agreement was signed between an entity of the Ministry of Forestry (Kepala Pusat 
Standardisasi dan Lingkungan Departmen Kehutanan) and a local NGO, Yayasan Peduli Citarum, for 
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activities of a farmers’ group in the village of Cikole, covering an area of 33 hectares ("Mid-Term 
Progress Report," 2009; Pirard & Billé, 2010). In both sites the contracts were for multi-strata 
agroforestry activities.  
 
Selection criteria for the sites are reported as having included: 
1. Residents of the areas that are the source of water are willing to cooperate to protect the 
area and participate in rehabilitation activities; 
2. Areas with a slope of between 20-40%; 
3. Critical land with the risk of landslides; 
4. Clear land ownership by farmers; 
5. Farmers are willing to organize themselves into groups and be actively involved as suppliers 
of environmental services as part of a PES mechanism (Cita-Citarum, 2011, p. 5). 
 
None of the material reviewed to date indicates the presence of a solid intermediary organization 
specifically dealing with the PES transactions, although the project’s mid-term report does reference 
a working group which seems to be an embryonic attempt to form an intermediary organization. 
 
The draft contracts provided in the mid-term report covered six to twelve months. This short 
duration was confirmed by Pirard and Billé (2010). However, in an interview with a representative of 
LP3ES in October 2012 it was mentioned that the project was still running, with contracts with two 
farmers’ groups for the period 2009-2014. 
 
3.7 Brantas 
 
The Brantas catchment, with a size of 1.2 million hectares, was one of the two Indonesia pilot sites 
of the three-year IIED project, “Developing Markets for Watershed Protection Services and 
Improved Livelihoods.” In Indonesia, IIED collaborated with the Indonesian NGO LP3ES. The project 
played an instrumental role in the establishment of a small pilot PWS scheme in two micro sites. 
This built on the existing interest of the Brantas River Basin Operator (Perusahaan Umum Jasa Tirta 
1, PJT1) which, “sees upstream land management as an alternative to downstream dredging and 
cleaning operations in maintaining water supplies for hydroelectricity and other uses” (Munawir & 
Vermeulen, 2007, p. 2). Previously PJT1 had transferred its conservation budget to district forest 
offices for tree planting activities. So investing in the pilot PWS scheme, albeit at an extremely small 
scale, was a logical move for the parastatal corporation.  
 
LP3ES and a local NGO, Yayasan Pengembangan Pedesaan (Rural Development Foundation, YPP), 
acted as intermediaries for the scheme, with payments running through YPP.  Two farmers’ groups 
in two villages were involved.  Sellers included small scale farmers with private land plots of 
between 0.1 and 0.25 hectares on critical land. A total of 40 hectares was covered. Two-year 
contracts, with the option of renewal, were signed in 2004 and 2005. Contracts required farmers to 
plant trees in agroforestry systems and to put in place high quality terracing, with payments being 
conditional upon meeting the terms of the contract. The buyer in this case was PJT1, who also 
played a role in site selection, focusing on areas which were considered to play the greatest role in 
downstream sedimentation (Munawir & Vermeulen, 2007). A third micro-site of 11 hectares was 
included in the second year of the project after potential participants approached the 
intermediaries and asked to be included.  
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By the end of the project, PJT1 was satisfied with the results of the work done by YPP and the 
farmers’ groups and, “indicated that it is willing to consider scaling up to incorporate all land in the 
critical category that is under private ownership” (Munawir & Vermeulen, 2007, p. 35). However, 
significant concerns remained about the potential to scale up the PWS scheme to a level where it 
would truly make a difference at a watershed scale. This is where PJT1’s interest lies – the company 
needs to see proof that the investment in upstream land use change would bring tangible results in 
downstream sedimentation reductions. It is a challenging situation, as the “pilot schemes would 
need to demonstrate real savings in dam and waterway maintenance costs at the local level for PJT1 
to commit to scaling the scheme up to the whole watershed” (Munawir & Vermeulen, 2007, p. 36). 
 
Following the completion of the IIED/ LP3ES work, in seemingly unrelated discussions, there 
continued to be strong interest in the potential of PWS in the watershed. Indeed, it appears that the 
potential of developing a provincial regulation on compensation for environmental services 
between upstream and downstream stakeholders was under discussion in 2007, although by 2010 it 
had not yet been realized (Widianto et al., 2010). During interviews conducted in October 2012, it 
was clarified that the regulation had failed to pass parliament, and that the pilot PWS scheme had 
faded off following completion of the project.  
 
3.8 Lombok 
 
From the literature reviewed to date it appears that a PWS scheme in Lombok has been 
approximately a decade in the making, and is likely not fully functional as of this writing (November 
2012). The process of establishing the scheme seems to have been marked by interest from 
different external players over time, and waxing and waning progress at the local level. The 
discussion appears to have been an important part of deliberations of how to deal with water 
management in Mataram and West Lombok district, and addressing conflicts between upstream 
and downstream stakeholders. Significantly, and in contrast to other PWS schemes that have been 
reviewed in Indonesia, this scheme appears designed to be mobilized “at scale,” generating 
resources that could make a meaningful and lasting difference to land use practices in the target 
area.  
 
Discussions about the potential for a PWS scheme in West Lombok and Mataram were apparently 
driven by the results of findings from at least two significant water-related initiatives in the early 
2000s. In 2001, World Neighbors, together with a number of local organizations, developed a 
concept to undertake participatory research in order to better understand natural resource 
management issues in the Rinjani Conservation area. This obtained support from the local 
government and financial input from external sources. The results of the research provided a much 
deeper understanding of the natural resource issues and conflict points in the area. Water and 
forestry management problems were prominent among these (Astawa, 2004). 
 
In 2002 and 2003, WWF, working with local NGOs such as KONSEPSI, government departments and 
a university, conducted an economic valuation of the water resources of the Rinjani catchment. 
They also conducted a study on water customers’ willingness to pay (Prasetyo et al., 2009). This 
information was then used as a basis for designing the scheme and for awareness raising and 
consultation meetings in the period up to 2004. By 2005 the scheme was ready to collect fees on a 
voluntary basis from users in Mataram, using collectors from each area of the city (kelurahan). 
However, this system did not work well as, among others things, the costs of collection were high.  
At that time, both WWF and LP3ES were involved in the scheme, but after a change in focus from a 
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voluntary scheme to one which would give a mandate to the scheme to systematically collect fees 
from all customers through the district water company, LP3ES decided to withdraw (interview, 
October 2012).  In perhaps a reflection of the challenges of developing such a system and the 
negotiations involved, it is interesting to note the observations of IIED and LP3ES as they were 
developing their pilot projects for Indonesia under the “Developing Markets for Watershed 
Protection Services and Improved Livelihoods” project. Initially the Segara River basin in West 
Lombok district was being considered for one of their potential PES pilot sites (Munawir et al., 
2003). However, in the 2005 workplan, the decision was made not to continue in Lombok as, “the 
potential buyer, PDAM, has stalled negotiations” (IIED, 2005).  
 
Following the failed attempt with voluntary collection of fees, a process was initiated to develop 
legislation supporting the scheme. In 2007 a district regulation (peraturan daerah) on the 
management of environmental services was issued (District of West Lombok, 2007). The focus of 
the regulation was on using PES to support conservation activities and the provision of development 
opportunities for residents near areas generating the services. Environmental services subject to 
direct use included above and below ground water that was commercialized; indirect services 
included different types of forest areas. Both individuals and legal entities which use the services 
would be subject to payments. In support of the scheme, a multi-stakeholder institution was to be 
established as a partner to government. The institution would be a forum including interests from 
relevant government departments, the private sector, local communities, NGOs, academia, and 
customers of PDAM. 
 
On the financial side, the regulation stated that income from the payments would be part of the 
district revenue. As an aside, apparently in the process of drafting the regulation, the Indonesian 
Ministry of Finance provided advice, and this element, where funds first went into a district account 
before being transferred into an account for the PES activities, could not be avoided (interview, 
October 2012). Payments were added to the water bills of PDAM customers. The regulation also 
provided guidance on the division of revenue, with 75% to be used for environmental service 
management activities, and 25% for the local government (in this case, according to an interview in 
October 2012, for use by the Forestry Service for forest restoration, although this is not specified in 
the regulation). The issuance of the regulation was followed by the signing in 2009 of an MoU 
between the District Head of West Lombok and PDAM Menang-Mataram about PES (Setiawan et al., 
2010). It appears, however, that acceptance of the fee was not universal amid complaints from 
some customers, and implementation of the system has not necessarily been smooth (2011). 
 
On the demand side it seems the system was better developed than on the supply side. Based on 
interviews in 2010, Pirard (2012, p. 26) noted that collection of money from customers of PDAM 
started in late 2009, but that “no PES-like contract has yet been finalised, reportedly because of a 
lack of capacities and the necessary human resources to negotiate and put the contracts in writing, 
rather than a lack of motivation and willingness from service providers”. Communication in October 
2012 indicated that contracts had by then been signed with suppliers, but it is unclear what the time 
frame is for the contracts and whether they include conditionality clauses, as one would expect to 
see under a fully operational PES scheme. It is also unclear how the other elements of the system 
are working, and in particular the flow of funds from Mataram city to West Lombok and the status 
of the government regulation (interviews, October 2012).   
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4. Summary and open questions 
 
While it is difficult to draw firm conclusions based on the first review conducted to date, it is 
nevertheless interesting to look for commonalities and differences related to various aspects of the 
schemes presented above.  The following summary focuses mainly on the schemes in Sumberjaya, 
Cidanau, Kapuas Hulu, Citarum, Brantas, and Lombok simply because of the lack of information 
available on the Lake Toba case.  
 
With the exception of the Sumberjaya conditional land tenure scheme, each of the schemes is of a 
relatively small scale. In terms of geographical location, three of the schemes are found in Sumatra, 
three in Java, one in Kalimantan, and one in Lombok.  Temporally, there seems to have been a 
period of interest in piloting the PES concept in the early to mid-2000s, with schemes being initiated 
in Sumberjaya, Cidanau, Brantas, and Lombok. The schemes in Kapuas Hulu and Citarum were 
initiated in the mid- to late 2000s. It will be interesting to follow developments and to see whether 
new initiatives will come on line following these. 
 
It appears that three external facilitators (see Section 4.2) have played a pivotal role in advancing 
the PES concept at the field level in Indonesia, and perhaps also at the national policy level, since 
policy development, and in particular the draft PES protocol mentioned in Section 3, has drawn 
heavily on existing field experience. With the exception of the Lake Toba scheme, one of three 
organizations – LP3ES, ICRAF and WWF – has played pivotal roles in each of the schemes.  LP3ES 
played a central role in the Cidanau, Citarum and Brantas schemes, ICRAF in the two Sumberjaya 
schemes, and WWF in the schemes in Kapuas Hulu and Lombok. Also, these organizations seem to 
have collaborated at different times in different manners, whether in terms of contributing to policy 
development or providing support to the individual schemes.  
 
External project funding was also important to the initiation of almost all the schemes, with perhaps 
the exception of the Lake Toba scheme, although there is little information available on that case. 
There are indications that the schemes in Sumberjaya, Cidanau and Lombok are now at a stage 
where they may continue without external funding support. With respect to the Sumberjaya 
RiverCare scheme and the scheme in Cidanau, it appears that recently buyers signed contracts with 
new suppliers, although this remains to be confirmed. In Lombok it seems that the scheme is 
continuing to move ahead, although indications are that it is still not fully operational and continues 
to face challenges. 
 
It seems that government actors played a rather prominent role in each of the schemes, particularly 
if one considers parastatal companies. In the Sumberjaya conditional land tenure scheme, activities 
were conducted on state land, with the Ministry of Forestry effectively acting as a beneficiary of the 
services, providing conditional land tenure as a reward to suppliers for specific land use actions. In 
Lombok and Kapuas Hulu, the district water companies represent water users as the beneficiaries in 
the schemes. In the Sumberjaya RiverCare scheme, a subsidiary of the state electricity company is 
the beneficiary.  Government actors play an important role as members of the intermediary 
organization in Cidanau and are also involved in Citarum. In Brantas, a parastatal company was the 
service buyer. 
 
Each of the schemes reviewed fits within the definition of PES adopted in this paper (Muradian et al. 
2010, see Section 2.1). The schemes do, however, differ in terms of the three criteria suggested by 
these authors. With respect to the first criterion, the importance of the economic incentive (or in 
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the case of the Sumberjaya conditional land tenure case, the reward incentive), based on limited 
information, it seems that in each case the incentive was relatively important in triggering the 
desired land use change. In terms of the second criterion, the directness of the transfer, in each 
case, with the exception of the conditional land tenure scheme and the Citarum scheme, payments 
were transferred (or in the case of Kapuas Hulu, are planned to be transferred) through at least one 
intermediary. In the case of Lombok, there are two steps between beneficiaries and providers, with 
funds first being collected by PDAM on behalf of the beneficiaries before being transferred to the 
multi-stakeholder institution that manages interactions with environmental service providers.  
Under the Kapuas Hulu scheme, funds will be collected by PDAM, and it is currently unclear whether 
there will be a separate intermediary managing distribution of funds to environmental service 
providers. In Citarum, perhaps since the scheme was relatively new, no intermediary was yet in 
place based on the information used in this review. In the conditional land tenure case, individual 
farmers are represented by farmers’ groups which were granted conditional tenure.  
 
Muradian et al. (2010, p. 1206) defined the third criterion, the degree of commodification of 
environmental services as, “the extent and clarity with which compensation received by the 
environmental service providers has been defined as a tradable commodity”. In each of the cases 
reviewed, with the exception of Sumberjaya RiverCare where payments were linked to 
sedimentation reduction, the situation resembles that described by Muradian et al. (2010, p. 1206) 
whereby, “the characterization of the commodity is fuzzy, based on inputs and assumptions (shared 
beliefs) about the relationship between land use and the provision of ecosystem services”. 
 
The following sections briefly touch upon some open questions that have been identified through 
the course of the literature reviewed to date. They are not intended as a comprehensive analysis, 
but rather serve to highlight some issues that seem relevant to the research project of which this 
paper is an early part.  
 
4.1 Integration of PES with broader land use and coastal planning 
 
The literature reviewed so far does not provide much information on how PES is integrated into 
broader watershed or spatial planning processes. Having said that, integration is in some situations 
implicit through, for example, targeting of critical areas. However, this is not always the case. 
Understanding how the schemes are integrated into broader processes may also be a matter of 
scale. For example, the selection criteria for national-level schemes show indications of being more 
diffuse (covering more services, for example, Costa Rica), or coarser (for example, early iterations of 
Mexico’s scheme) when compared to local schemes, as evidenced by the Pimampiro scheme in 
Ecuador (Wunder et al., 2008) or the Cidanau watershed in Indonesia (Leimona et al., 2010).  
Additionally, as is the case in Indonesia, the implementation of PES in many contexts is still in the 
early, mainly pilot stages, so it may therefore be understandable that there has been little empirical 
work looking at how these schemes fit into broader processes. It would be useful, however, to keep 
this in mind as policy processes unfold, and new schemes come on line. With respect to PWS, Bond 
and Mayers (2010, p. 88) see them as “a tool that will fail, or become irrelevant, if not integrated 
with wider regulatory approaches, broader watershed management efforts, and explicit attention to 
governance influences that shape what is possible”. It can be expected that we will see more 
consideration of how PES schemes fit into broader spatial planning processes in the case of schemes 
linked to REDD+ simply because the emerging REDD+ architecture focuses heavily on national level 
emissions reductions, with sub-national implementation. 
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PES in coastal and marine environments are likely to prove more complicated to design and 
implement than terrestrial schemes due in part to the basic fact that, “[t]he location of [coastal and 
marine ecosystems] in the land-sea interface […] leads to a high degree of interconnectedness […] 
across these systems and their services, which may considerably enhance the ecosystem service 
provided by one single habitat” (Barbier, 2012, p. 12). There is also much less scientific 
understanding of the ecosystem services of these ecosystems when compared to the terrestrial 
realm. In addition, resource tenure may tend to be even more diffuse and problematic in coastal 
areas than it already is in many terrestrial areas of Indonesia (see Section 4.4). Given the fact that 
there are few examples of operational PES schemes in coastal and marine ecosystems, it is not 
surprising that the literature on the link between these types of schemes and broader watershed 
management is thin. 
 
4.2 Role of intermediaries and facilitators 
 
Facilitators of PES schemes are defined here as organizations external to the architecture of the PES 
scheme which nevertheless play a central role in the design of the system and may provide on-going 
support during some parts of implementation. In the Indonesia case, using this definition, ICRAF, 
LP3ES and WWF would be considered as facilitators. Intermediaries in the context of PES can be 
defined as, “the agents mediating transfer of resources between users and providers” (Kosoy et al., 
2007, p. 447). They often play a central role in the design and implementation of PES schemes, as 
highlighted by the findings of Bond and Mayers (2010, p. 57) that within their sample of local PWS 
initiatives, approximately three quarters of payments to farmers went through intermediaries.  
There are a range of organizations that play the role of intermediary under different circumstances. 
In a study of 47 PWS schemes worldwide, Brouwer et al. (2011, p. 389) found that, “[m]ost 
intermediaries in the schemes were national government (41%) or local NGOs (33%). Other 
intermediaries included local municipalities (11%) and international donors (6%).”  
 
The role of intermediaries can vary between schemes, with common functional responsibilities cited 
as being:  
“-  Scientific advice to project developers, particularly regarding the identification of expected downstream 
services; 
- Design of payment mechanisms, feasibility studies, management plans and monitoring systems; 
- Facilitation of negotiations among all stakeholders; 
- Land management capacity-building; 
- Collection of hydrological data; 
- Contract administration, allocation of funds and payments; and 
- Provision of buying and selling services as an intermediary”. (Greiber, 2009, pp. 8-9) 
 
Several authors have noted that intermediaries also have a role in determining the prices of services 
and can be important in reducing the transaction costs of the schemes (Bond & Mayers, 2010; Vatn, 
2010).  
 
Given the central role of intermediaries in many schemes, a number of authors have noted that 
these actors can have significant power to shape the scheme, and in fact are often the dominant 
agent (Leimona et al., 2010; Muradian et al., 2010; Vatn, 2010). The PES literature tends to describe 
the role of facilitators and intermediaries in different schemes, but there is less analysis of the 
implications of that role.  As a very simple example of these implications, in a discussion of PES 
schemes in Indonesia, Pirard and Billé (2010, p. 9) noted that among a number of schemes reviewed 
in Indonesia the schemes in Cidanau and Citarum were similar, which they said can in part be 
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explained by the, “presence of the same facilitator”. As Pascual et al. (2010, p. 1242) note, 
“intermediaries (NGOs for example) often have a particular agenda, normally linked to international 
cooperation agencies, which increasingly are important players in the implementation of PES in 
developing countries”. Given the critical role of facilitators and intermediaries, the different agendas 
they can bring to schemes, and the fact that their role “in shaping the performance of PES has been 
rather neglected in the literature” (Pascual et al., 2010, p. 1242), Muradian et al. (2010, p. 1205) 
note that, “to analyze the power of intermediary agents to steer the transfer of resources between 
buyers and providers is then an important subject for research which has not yet been sufficiently 
addressed in the literature”. 
 
4.3 Gender 
 
Across the literature reviewed to date, including material focusing on equity, poverty and 
livelihoods, there is very little focus on the gender implications of PES schemes. It seems that this is 
not because there are no impacts, but rather that the connections are under-researched. 
Confirming this view, Porras et al. (2008) have observed that “there has been very little attempt to 
assess the impact of PES initiatives on women or the extent to which they are represented as 
suppliers”. This could be an area for research, especially in PES schemes that have been operational 
for some time. Separately, any new research undertaken could seek ways to adequately reflect 
gender considerations in the research design. 
 
4.4 Tenure 
 
While the importance of tenure issues in the conceptualization of PES is quite central in the PES 
literature (as briefly discussed in Chapter 3 of this paper), empirical research focusing explicitly on 
the implications of different tenure arrangements and related conflicts on decisions taken related to 
the selection of sites for implementation of PES schemes, and the design and operation of the 
schemes, seems to be lacking in the Indonesian case, with the notable exception of the Sumberjaya 
scheme in Lampung. This does not necessarily mean that tenure was not the subject of 
deliberations when the schemes were established. It is entirely possible that tenure considerations 
were an important element in the decision-making process, but that the deliberations and 
justifications for decisions are recorded in grey literature, project reports, other records, or not at 
all, rather than being systematically analyzed in the academic literature.  
 
This leaves a gap in our understanding that is particularly relevant in the case of Indonesia where 
tenure issues are so salient. And if we shift our focus to exploring the potential of PES for coastal 
and marine environments, the gap becomes even more significant. Property rights in coastal and 
marine ecosystems, which are frequently comprised of wetland environments, are often contested.  
As Adger and Luttrell (2000, p. 76) explain,  
“many wetlands areas lack a long history of ownership, clear tenure rights or any official 
delineation of property rights. Furthermore, traditional land rights are frequently not 
recognized […] Often lack of adaptation leads to a situation with great potential for conflict 
due to the overlapping property regimes between opposing interest groups [at different 
levels].” 
 
Dealing with tenure issues within the scope of conceptualizing PES schemes in such environments is 
likely to be even more challenging that it is in terrestrial areas.  
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Concluding remark 
 
The review of PES experiences in Indonesian watershed contexts presented in this Working Paper is 
an early preliminary output of our recently initiated research on new instruments in Indonesian 
coastal and watershed governance. Following this largely desk-based analysis, we are planning to 
conduct field research in selected Indonesian watersheds were PES schemes have been or are 
currently operational or envisaged. This research aims at contributing to a better understanding of 
the evolution and functioning of new governance instruments in the context of Indonesian 
watershed and coastal governance.  
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